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 1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the theoretical implications of multi-dimensional het-
erogeneity of agent-skills and of interactions between the innate and acquired
comparative advantages of individual agents. While many existing models
deal with one-dimensaional human capital skills when they analyze invest-
ment decisions, the model in this paper looks at multi-dimensional skill
investments. Several studies have looked at the comparative advantages of
individual agents that come from multi-dimensional heterogeneity, but none
examined the interaction between ex ante and ex post diﬀerences in agent’s
comparative advantages. This paper introduces the innate heterogeneity of
agents with multi-dimensional skills and considers the directional incentives
for individual agents to invest in their human capital skills: general skill
i n v e s t m e n t sv e r s u ss p e c i ﬁc skill investments.
The model looks at the distinction between general and speciﬁch u m a n
capital investment as in Becker (1993), although not in exactly the similar
manner. While general skills are useful for many other employers, both
inside and outside their current industry, speciﬁc skills in this paper are not
only useful skills for the current employer but also for employers in the same
sector. Therefore, in this paper, speciﬁc skills denote sector-speciﬁc skills.
This paper adopts multi-dimensional heterogeneity and follows the regu-
lar job-assignment models based on individual comparative advantages. The
model in this paper starts from the Roy (1951) model from labor economics
(as with Ohnsorge and Treﬂer 2007 and Costinot and Vogel 2010), but asks
ad i ﬀerent question: What are the directional incentives of human capital
investment for individual agents given the terms of trade uncertainty?
When the heterogeneity of human capital skills is multi-dimensional, the
investment decision involves not only how much to invest but also which skill
(direction) to enhance. For example, if each agent is endowed with two types
of skills such as mathematics and music, then the question is which school
(say, MIT to enhance math skills or Juilliard to enhance musical skills)
the agent should enter in addition to the regular human-capital-investment
question of how long he or she should attend the chosen school. If an agent
chooses between somewhat specialized schools, then he or she is deciding to
make a specialized human capital investment. Instead, an agent might go to
a school (say, Harvard to enhance both math and music skills) where he or
she can do a double major in music and math. In this case, an agent conducts
a generalized human capital investment. This paper asks what type of agents
will choose specialized investment or generalized investment and explores the
relationship between the innate (ex ante) comparative advantages and the
2acquired or post-education (post-investment) comparative advantages.1
The analysis will be conducted under uncertainty because, without it, all
agents will make speciﬁc investments based on his or her innate comparative
advantage. With uncertainty, many agents will enhance their comparative
advantage skills regardless of their degree of risk aversion. This occurs if the
agents have very strong comparative advantage in one type of skill. How-
ever, some risk averse agents may make general skill investments if their
comparative advantage is not particularly strong in either type. Under cer-
tain conditions, we ﬁnd that some agents make speciﬁc skill investments in
the direction of their innately weak comparative advantages. In particu-
lar, we can ﬁnd some agents whose optimal human capital investment de-
cisions reverse their ex ante comparative advantages ex post. The acquired
comparative advantage may well be diﬀerent from the innate comparative
advantage.
To introduce uncertainty in a simple manner, I adopt the assumption of
small open economy where output prices are exogenous in the model. Several
papers have looked at the problem of human capital investment with inter-
national trade, including Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983) and Falvey, Green-
away, and Silva (2010).2 However, these papers dealt with one-dimensional
skill. So there was no question about specialization versus generalization
in human capital skill investments. In this paper, by working with multi-
dimensional skill model, I will try to work on the dichotomy of specialized
skill investments versus general skill investments within the set up of open
economy. In particular, this paper oﬀers the ﬁrst model to link innate multi-
dimensional heterogeneity of individuals with the directional (speciﬁcv e r s u s
general) incentive to invest in their human capital skills.3
This paper oﬀers an analysis of directional incentives of human capital
investment by individual agents. When worker skills are multi-dimensional,
the direction of investment becomes a choice problem. Each individual may
specialize in one type of skill or may generalize in multiple skills. Both the
specialization and generalization of skills have costs and beneﬁts. Several
previous studies have looked at these issues, but all of them (with which the
1This paper does not address the question of how long agents choose to go to school.
Please refer to Becker (1993) for this choice problem.
2In a recent paper, Bougheas and Riezman (2007) looked at the determinants of trade
in relation to the distribution of human capital. There, even if the countries are the
same in the aggregate endowments of human capital, the diﬀerence in the properties of
distribution of human capital explains the diﬀerent patterns of trade.
3Note that, in traditional labor literature, speciﬁc human capital investment usually
means ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills rather than industry- or sector-speciﬁc. In this paper, it is the
latter.
3author is familiar) started from identical agents who conduct either speciﬁc
or general investments. No previous study looked at the case of the innate
heterogeneity of individual agents with multi-dimensional skills.
When there are increasing returns on human capital investment, Sherwin
Rosen (1983) showed that specialized investments tend to prevail in a model
without uncertainty. The importance of specialization has also long been
widely recognized. (See, for example, the very ﬁrst chapter in Wealth of
Nations by Adam Smith 1776.) The division of labor and specialization are
the key sources of higher productivity in the modern world. The division
of labor may be the result of endowed diﬀerences in individual comparative
advantages as in Rosen (1978). Specialization, however, may also be a result
of specialized human capital investment as in Rosen (1983). It is now widely
recognized that individual agents have an incentive to specialize when there
is no uncertainty about which sector individuals are employed. [Kevin M.
Murphy (1986), p. 37.]
When the world is uncertain, however, ex-ante speciﬁch u m a nc a p i t a l
investment may be a risky strategy because specialization makes individual
agents inﬂexible as factors of production ex post. To borrow the expres-
sions from Gene M. Grossman and Carl Shapiro (1982), an investment in
specialization is like reducing “the degree of intersectoral mobility” in a
subsequent period. A general (as opposed to speciﬁc) human capital invest-
ment is a form of self-insurance if insurance markets are absent. (See, for
example, Ehrlich and Becker 1972.) A general investment brings the ben-
eﬁto fg r e a t e rﬂexibility in responding to economic change. Murphy (1986,
section 5.2) also looked at a case where there is uncertainty about which
sector will become favorable. He also concluded that less specialization ex-
poses workers to less risk. Both Grossman and Shapiro (1982) and Murphy
(1986) examined the individuals’ incentives to make general versus speciﬁc
human capital investment when every agent is identical before conducting
an investment in human capital skill(s). So, what happens to these results if
we start from a situation in which agents are heterogeneous in their innate
comparative advantage before making the human capital investment? In
this paper, I aim to analyze the incentives of individual agents to invest in
human capital skills when the role of endowed diﬀerences is important.
By looking at the directional incentives to invest in human capital skills
for the self-selection model of occupational choice, I am able to address
the following (new) set of research questions: What is the role of endowed
diﬀerences of individuals in human capital investment? Do people with het-
erogeneous skills specialize or generalize their innate skills when the world is
uncertain? What kind of people do invest in their innately strong (compara-
4tive advantage) skills? Do people specialize in what they were relatively good
at when they were born? If so, under what conditions? Do agents invest
their time (and money) to enhance their skills in a socially ineﬃcient way?
Do they go to schools in which they will learn something they are innately
poor at? Will there be the same number of job-switching individuals if we
allow the dynamic development of human capital? All of these questions
were unanswered by previous work in this ﬁeld since they assumed identical
agents before the decision of human capital investment. Although there is
a large volume of literature on human capital investment, to my knowledge
there is no previous work that starts from multi-dimensional heterogeneity.
I introduce such a model in the next section.
I ﬁnd that, in general, many workers tend to specialize in their strengths
even under uncertainty. This is true especially for the workers who have
a very strong innate comparative advantage in one sector. For example, if
you are born a good singer and you did not do well in high school, then you
will choose to go to a school of music to enhance your strong innate skills
in terms of comparative advantage.
For workers who are born almost equally good in both sectors, the prob-
lem becomes very diﬃcult. Some workers try to invest in general skills so
that they can choose their jobs in a ﬂexible manner once the uncertainty
resolves. Others may specialize in their innately strong or weak skills de-
pending on their attitude toward risk.
If workers are very risk averse, we ﬁnd that some workers decide to make
specialized investments in their weak skills (in the direction of their com-
parative disadvantages) rather than in their strong ones (in the direction of
their comparative advantages). This happens to those who have skills whose
levels are similar enough so that their degree of comparative advantage is
not very strong. For example, consider a person A who has high talent in
music but also has a high IQ. This person might choose to give up music to
go to MIT even if his talent in music is actually the stronger of his skills. On
the other hand, suppose there is another person, B, who has similar skills as
person A. Suppose also that B’s music skills are not as good as A’sa n dt h a t
B’s IQ is slightly higher than A’s. Therefore, if there is no uncertainty, A
c h o o s e st ob eam u s i c i a na n dBg i v e su pt h ei d e ao fb e i n gam u s i c i a nt of o c u s
on academic study. However, given the setup of the model with uncertainty,
A goes to MIT by giving up becoming a musician and B goes to Juilliard
to be a musician! So the reversal of training occurs for those who are in
certain classes of skills in this model. In the end, we may see some cases
where a person’s comparative advantage reverse from ex ante to ex post.
Person A (respectively, B) has a comparative advantage in music (respec-
5tively, academic skills) ex ante, but after the training A (respectively, B)
has a comparative advantage in academic skills (respectively, music). This
reversal result is quite new as far as we know.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows: the next section
develops the basic model of human capital investment with two dimensional
heterogeneity of innate skills. The ﬁnal section summarizes the results and
suggests some possible extensions.
2T h e M o d e l
We consider a simple two-period and two-sector model of a small open econ-
omy that faces exogenously given international output prices. In period 0,
no production takes place, agents are endowed with multi-dimensional het-
erogeneous skills, and they invest in their human capital to enhance their
innate skills. Uncertainty about the terms of trade will be realized in period
1 and agents choose their occupations and engage in production. Multi-
dimensional skills are embodied in an individual agent and can only be sold
as a package. Therefore, we assume that an individual agent can take only
one job at a time.
Output markets for sectors X and Y are assumed to be competitive,
both internationally and domestically. In making the investment decision
in period 0, each agent is assumed to have rational expectations concerning
the prices that will prevail in period 1.
The economy consists of a continuum of self-employed agents j ∈ J, each
of whom is endowed with an individual-speciﬁc occupational skill vector
(θj,τj) jointly distributed over a unit square [0,1] × [0,1] ⊂ R2 in period
0.4 Let Θt and Ft(θ,τ) denote the space and the joint distribution function
of human capital skills for each period t =0 ,1.T h u s ,w ek n o wt h a tΘ0 =
[0,1] × [0,1].L e tft(θ,τ) > 0 denote the joint density function for Ft(θ,τ),
and assume that ft is integrable over any partition of the human capital skill
space Θt for t =0 ,1. Agents are price takers in the output markets. Each
component of the skill vector (θj,τj) represents an sector-speciﬁch u m a n
capital skill; their magnitudes measure the capabilities of the agent j in the
production of X and Y in eﬃciency units.
Once the terms of trade become known in period 1, each agent decides
either to produce X using θ,o rY using τ. Each individual undertakes
only one occupation at a time because human capital skills are assumed to
4Type space does not have to be a unit square. Here for simplicity, a unit square type
space is assumed.
6be embodied in human beings. [Murphy (1986, Sec.II)] Each component of
the skill vector (θj,τj) is indivisible and non-transferable. The size of the
components of individual skill vectors in each period (θj,τj) ∈ Θt is private
information for j, but its aggregate distribution Ft is publicly known.
To summarize, the timing of the model is as follows:
1. In period 0, the type of each individual (θj,τj) ∈ [0,1]×[0,1] = Θ0 is
given.
2. An individual choose to invest in human capital skills for either sector
X or Y , or both. This individual decision will create the new skill
space Θ1 and the new distribution of skills F1(θ,τ) f o rp e r i o d1 .
3. In period 1, a new relative price P1 =( PX,P Y ) is realized.
4. An individual chooses occupation and produce.
Let us now state the assumptions about human capital investment and
uncertainty.
2.1 Key Assumptions of the Model
Let us now state the assumptions about how individual agents can invest in
their skills in period 0. There are two kinds of human capital investment: (1)
General Human Capital Investment and (2) Sector SpeciﬁcH u m a nC a p i t a l
Investment. Because there are two directions in sector speciﬁci n v e s t m e n t s ,
we can categorize possible investments into three investment types.
A1: [Human Capital Investment] An individual with the skill vector
(θ,τ) can choose among the three types of human capital investment:
IHC ∈ {SX,G,S Y } which are listed as:
1. SX = Speciﬁc Investment in Sector X: (θ,τ)= ⇒ (βθ,τ)
2. G = General Investment in both sectors: (θ,τ)= ⇒ (αθ,ατ)
3. SY =S p e c i ﬁc Investment in Sector Y: (θ,τ)= ⇒ (θ,βτ)
where α and β represent parameters such that
β > α > 1. (1)
The fact that both parameters are larger than 1 implies that human cap-
ital investment, regardless of speciﬁcity or generality, is eﬀective. The size of
7investment eﬃciency for speciﬁci n v e s t m e n tβ is assumed to be larger than
that for general investment α. Otherwise, everyone will invest in general
skills alone because speciﬁc skill investment will be dominated by general
investment in either direction.
It is assumed that the speciﬁc investments in two sectors share the same
parameter β. This means that the eﬀect of the speciﬁci n v e s t m e n ti ss y m -
metric between sector X and Y. It is also assumed that only one type of
general investment can occur. General investment enhances skills in both
sectors in a symmetric manner. Both components will be multiplied by the
same α. These symmetry assumptions are made to simplify the analysis.
Another peculiarity about investment technology is that the eﬀect of
investments is proportional to the individual’s original strength (innate ca-
pabilities) in each sector. If your innate skill θ in sector X production is
very large, then your post investment skill in the same sector βθ will be
proportionally large. This assumption is appropriate if all agents in the
economy are considered to be young. For example, young Michael Jordan
can be trained to be a superstar because of his exceptional innate talent
as a basketball player. The eﬀect of training Jordan is much larger than
the eﬀect of training a mediocre player. The assumption of proportional
eﬀectiveness of human capital skill investment would create a theoretical
problem if we were to start thinking about an economy with matured (and
old) agents who already have invested in their skills and have little margin
for additional skill development. However, we focus on this particular case
of proportionality in this paper.
Compared to more general investment frontier depicted in Murphy (1986)
and Grossman and Shapiro (1982), this paper’ss p e c i ﬁcation of human cap-
ital investment given by the above assumption is somewhat restrictive by
not allowing a range of intermediate cases (such as 40% on X and 60% on
Y, etc.) in general investment. This restrictive assumption is made for
simplicity. The fact that β is larger than α means an implicit assumption
about some form of increasing returns from specialization in human capital
investment. Because β is larger than α, we can conclude that the type space
in period 1 should be Θ1 ⊂ [0,β] × [0,β].
Now let us assume that all consumers have identical and homothetic
preferences that can be represented by a utility function u(x,y) for positive
consumption amounts for each product: x>0 and y>0.W h e nw ed e n o t e
the income of the individuals as M>0 and the vector of output prices as
P ≡ (PX,P Y ), then the indirect utility function for homothetic preferences
8can be written as the following separable function:
V (P,M)=C(P) · v(M) (2)
We know, by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), that the price-index function
C(P) is linear homogeneous and concave in P. The part v(M) is an increas-
ing function of income M of an individual. If the original utility function
u(x,y) is homogeneous of degree one, then v(M)=M should hold. There-
fore, if the agents are risk neutral, the indirect utility can be written as
V (P,M)=C(P) · M (3)
and if the agents are risk averse, then v(M) in the equation (2) is strictly
concave in M. [Jack Hirshleifer and John G. Riley, 1992, p. 32.] Thus, we
could write v0 > 0 and v00 < 0. For now, let us leave the second one as
v00 ≤ 0, in order to include both cases of risk neutrality and risk aversion.
Now let us introduce uncertainty in period 1. Since we assume that we
live in a small open economy, every individual agent takes terms of trade
(output prices) as given. Suppose there are two states of nature, as follows:
A2. [Uncertainty] Uncertainty about the terms of trade in period 1 takes
the following symmetric form:
P1 =
½
(p,1) with probability 1
2
(1,p) with probability 1
2
(4)
where p is a positive parameter larger than 1.
We concentrate on a case with the same probability for the two states
of nature. When the state of nature is such that P1 =( p,1), producers in
sector X will beneﬁti np e r i o d1b e c a u s ePX will be more expensive relative
to PY .W h e nP1 =( 1 ,p) occurs, producers in sector Y will beneﬁtb e c a u s e
PY will be more expensive relative to PX.A sw eh a v es e e ni nt h er e g u l a rs e l f -
selection models based on individual comparative advantage, the realization
of particular terms of trade may induce some workers to take diﬀerent jobs
once the uncertainty is resolved. (See, for example, Sattinger 1975.) Thus,
some agents will choose to work in a favorable sector while others may stay
in the sector at which they were innately good.
Let us further assume that the demand condition is symmetric in sectors
X and Y . In the equation of indirect utility (2), C(P) represents a consumer
price index (CPI).
9A3. [Equal CPI] The consumer price index (CPI) in period 1 is the same
for the diﬀerent states of the world, namely
C(p,1) = C(1,p) (5)
holds in the neighborhood.
This assumption will enable us to compare welfare by directly looking at
v(M) in (2), the utility part only from income in period 1 without worrying
about substitution eﬀects in consumption. (See Appendix for an explana-
tion.) This way, irrespective of the outcome of uncertain terms of trade, we
can compare the economic welfare of individual agents only by looking at
v(M).
Assume also that no income-insurance market exists. (See Grossman
and Shapiro [1982] for a comparison between self-insurance versus insurance
markets.)
A4. [No Insurance] The market for income insurance is absent.
This may be because there is no market for skills per se. Or it may be
because information asymmetry5 prevents insurance ﬁrms from operating
proﬁtably. According to an article in The Economist (March 26, 1994), the
capital markets for human capital investment may be imperfect. The article
r e a d sa sf o l l o w s :“For instance, borrowing to ﬁnance an investment in human
capital may be diﬃcult because would-be trainees lack collateral, or because
the costs of administration and collection make such loans unattractive to
private lenders.” In any case, we focus on the case without insurance.
Given the investment made in period 0 and given the resolved terms of
trade, individual agents choose their occupations and start producing either
X or Y in period 1. How do individual agents decide in which sector to
work? To determine this, let’s ﬁrst introduce a constant-returns-to-scale





where NX and NY are the total sum of (eﬀective) skill levels employed in
each sector.6 Given the realization of terms of trade, P, the skill space in
5Skill levels are private information about the individual agents and the insurance
company cannot know them.
6We could add coeﬃcients in the production functions such as x = γNX,b u tw eo m i t
them for the sake of simplicity.
10period 1, Θ1, can be partitioned into two: (1) ΘX(P) ···group of producers










All individual agents earn wages that are equal to the value of their mar-
ginal product. Therefore, when the terms of trade is given as P =( PX,P Y ),
if an individual with a vector of skills (θ,τ) who engages in production in
sector X, then that individual earns a wage of PXθ, while the same individual
earns PY τ if he or she engages in production in sector Y. So whether an in-
dividual (θ,τ) works in sector X or Y depends on the direction of inequality
in
PXθ ≷ PY τ. (8)
Thus, an individual who had made human capital investment IHC ∈ {SX,G,S Y }
in period 0 and faces terms of trade P ≡ (PX,P Y ) ∈ {(p,1),(1,p)} in pe-
riod 1 will earn the income M(IHC,P). The possible combinations can be
written as follows:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
M(SX,(p,1)) = max [ pβθ , τ ]
M(G,(p,1)) = max [ pαθ , ατ ]
M(SY ,(p,1)) = max [ pθ , βτ ]
M(SX,(1,p)) = max [ βθ ,p τ ]
M(G,(1,p)) = max [ αθ ,p ατ ]
M(SY ,(1,p)) = max [ θ ,p βτ ]
(9)
Given this information about possible income in period 1, we can now con-
sider the expected utility of an individual (θ,τ) who conducted human cap-
ital investment IHC ∈ {SX,G,S Y } in period 0. Since the lottery about
terms of trade in period 1 is given by (4), expected utility U(IHC) for each











2v[M(SY ,(p,1))] + 1
2v[M(SY ,(1,p))]}· C(P1)
(10)
where C(P1) ≡ C(p,1) = C(1,p) is deﬁned as such from (5). Thus, to
compare the sizes among (10), we only need to compare the inside of the
curly brackets {} because we can think of C(P1) as an exogenous parameter.
We will come back to this point later.
11Now, to leave space for analysis, I would like to make additional innocu-
ous assumption about the size of risk. Let us consider the case with large
risk in this paper.
A5. [Risk Size] We focus on our analysis for the case of p>β.T h es i z eo f
the price parameter is larger than the size of a parameter for speciﬁc
human capital investment.
The reason for this assumption is a matter of simplicity. By assuming oth-
erwise, the analysis is very similar except for the combination of parameters
and cases. For those who are interested in the other case of p<β, please
consult my Ph.D. Dissertation, Ichida (2004, Ch. 4), for the case of risk-
neutral agents.
2.2 Incentives for Each Individual Agent
With the assumptions given by A1.-A5. above, let us now consider the
incentives for each individual agent. What type of human capital investment
do agents choose? What jobs do agents take once the uncertainty is resolved?
If all agents were identical before the investment decision as in Grossman
and Shapiro (1982) and in Murphy (1986), then in equilibrium all investment
choices must give the same expected utility. Otherwise, every agent will pick
the best alternative that gives the highest expected utility level. The income
of all agents in period 1 must also be equalized across sectors for identical-
agents-case. That is how the allocation of jobs would be done. However,
this shall not be the case for the model in this paper because agents are
born to be diﬀerent. In fact, agents are heterogeneous in both absolute and
relative skill levels in both periods. Depending on the relative sizes of skills
in the vector (θ,τ), the largest income that is chosen among those in (9)
may diﬀer.
Therefore, let us break down the initial type space Θ0 =[ 0 ,1]2 (in period
0) into the following eight partitions by possible occupational choice with
12diﬀerent investment choices and with diﬀerent risk outcomes.
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
K1 :( θ,τ) ∈ [0,1]2 ∩ { 0 < τ < 1
pβθ }
K2 :( θ,τ) ∈ [0,1]2 ∩ { 1
pβθ < τ < 1
pθ }
K3 :( θ,τ) ∈ [0,1]2 ∩ { 1
pθ < τ <
β
pθ }
K4 :( θ,τ) ∈ [0,1]2 ∩ {
β
pθ < τ < θ }
K5 :( θ,τ) ∈ [0,1]2 ∩ { θ < τ <
p
βθ }
K6 :( θ,τ) ∈ [0,1]2 ∩ {
p
βθ < τ <p θ }
K7 :( θ,τ) ∈ [0,1]2 ∩ { pθ < τ <p βθ }
K8 :( θ,τ) ∈ [0,1]2 ∩ { pβθ < τ < ∞ }
(11)
I will explain the meaning of these partitions in words.
1. Think about the case where an individual conducted SX (speciﬁc
investment in sector X skill) in period 0. We think of the case of
M(SX,(p,1)) or M(SX,(1,p)). If the terms of trade turn out to be
favorable to sector X, i.e. (p,1) is realized,7 then agents in
S7
i=1 Ki
will produce in sector X while those in K8 will produce in sector Y. If
the terms of trade turn out to be favorable to sector Y, i.e. (1,p) is
realized, then agents in
S3
i=1 Ki w i l lp r o d u c ei ns e c t o rXw h i l et h o s e
in
S8
i=4 Ki will produce in sector Y.
2. Think about the case where an individual conducted G (general invest-
ment) in period 0. We think of the case of M(G,(p,1)) or M(G,(1,p)).
If the terms of trade turn out to be favorable to sector X, i.e. (p,1) is
realized, then agents in
S6
i=1 Ki w i l lp r o d u c ei ns e c t o rXw h i l et h o s e
in
S8
i=7 Ki will produce in sector Y. If the terms of trade turn out to
be favorable to sector Y, i.e. (1,p) is realized, then agents in
S2
i=1 Ki
will produce in sector X while those in
S8
i=3 Ki will produce in sector
Y.
3. Think about a case in which an individual conducted SY (a speciﬁc
investment in sector Y skill) in period 0. We think of the case of
M(SY ,(p,1)) or M(SY ,(1,p)). If the terms of trade turn out to be
favorable to sector X, i.e. (p,1) is realized,8 then agents in
S5
i=1 Ki
will produce in sector X while those in
S8
i=6 Ki will produce in sector
Y. If the terms of trade turn out to be favorable to sector Y, i.e. (1,p)
is realized, then agents in K1 w i l lp r o d u c ei ns e c t o rXw h i l et h o s ei n S8
i=2 Ki will produce in sector Y.
7This also means that the individual guessed correctly.
8This also means that the individual guessed wrong.
13Given the above examination of individual decisions about which sector
agents work in period 1, we want to think about the investment incentives
of individuals in each partition by using backward induction. However, the
kind of investment each individual chooses depends on the agent’sa t t i t u d e
toward risk.
2.3 Expected Utility and Attitude toward Risk
Now, because the expected utility function can represent the same preference
up to the monotonic linear transformation,9 we can deﬁne the expected
utility for the agents in partition Ki who conducted investment IHC as
follows: for all i ∈ {1,2,..,8}, a new von-Neumann Morgenstern expected




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
(θ,τ)∈Ki
. (12)
T h i sc a nb ed o n eb e c a u s eC(P1) ≡ C(p,1) = C(1,p) is an exogenous para-
meter, as we noted before. For the agents in diﬀerent partitions in (11), we
are able to calculate the von-Neumann Morgenstern expected utility func-
tion V (Ki,IHC) by combining the equations of income (9) and the equations
of the expected utility (10). The v(M) part of the equations (10) can be
thought of as the Bernoulli utility function. When v00 =0 , we can say that
agents are risk neutral and when v00 < 0, we can say that agents are strictly
risk averse.
Here I would like to introduce speciﬁc functional forms for the Bernoulli





1−ρ for ρ 6=1
lnM for ρ =1
where the size of ρ represents the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. To
simplify the analysis, I focus on some speciﬁc cases in this paper.
Three cases of diﬀerent attitude toward risk will be analyzed: (1) RN =
r i s kn e u t r a lc a s e ,( 2 )R A 1=r i s ka v e r s i o nw i t hac o e ﬃcient of relative risk
aversion is 1, and (3) RA2 = risk aversion with a coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion is 2. Let us start with the risk neutral case.
RN When the agents are risk neutral, the Bernoulli utility function takes
the linear form: v(M)=M.
9See Prop.6B1 in page 173 of Mas-Colell et al. (1995).
14The case for risk neutrality (RN) is straightforward. We adopt simply the
linear function without coeﬃcients for the Bernoulli utility.
The case for risk averse is more complicated because there are many
ways to be risk averse. To make it easier to obtain the analytical results, let
us focus on the following two cases of risk aversion.
RA1 One type of risk averse agents has a Bernoulli utility function in the
form of v(M)=l nM. The parameter for relative risk aversion for this
log form is constant at 1.
The ﬁrst type of risk aversion RA1 utilizes log utility form. This utility has
a constant elasticity for any income level.
RA2 Another type of risk averse agent has a Bernoulli utility function in
the form of v(M)=− 1
M. The parameter for relative risk aversion for
this form is 2.
The second type of risk aversion RA2 utilizes the negative inverse form of
utility. The parameter for relative risk aversion is greater than 1. Therefore,
the degree of risk aversion is the strongest among these three cases.
2.4 The results for individual agents
L e tu ss t a t et h em a i nr e s u l tf o rt h eR Nc a s ea sT h e o r e m1 .
Theorem 1 When the assumptions given by A1.-A5. hold in the model with
the RN Bernoulli utility function v(M)=M, the following three situations
will occur depending on the size of the parameter value of α.
(i) All agents in the economy will make speciﬁc investments in the direc-
tion of their innate comparative advantage; agents (θ,τ) ∈ Θ0 with
τ < θ will make SX (Speciﬁc investment in sector X) and agents
(θ,τ) ∈ Θ0 with τ > θ will invest SY (Speciﬁc investment in sector






(ii) There will be some agents who will make general investments G.I n
particular, agents (θ,τ) ∈ Θ0 with
β − α
α − 1




15will invest G (General investment in both sectors), agents (θ,τ) ∈ Θ0
with




will invest SX, and agents (θ,τ) ∈ Θ0 with
α − 1
β − α
· θ < τ < ∞
will invest SY , if the parameter of general investment is within a par-




(p +1 ) β
p + β
.
(iii) There will be some agents who will make general investments G.I n
particular, agents (θ,τ) ∈ Θ0 with
pβ + β − pα
pα
· θ < τ <
pα
pβ + β − pα
· θ
will invest G (General investment in both sectors), agents (θ,τ) ∈ Θ0
with
0 < τ <
pβ + β − pα
pα
· θ
will invest SX, and agents (θ,τ) ∈ Θ0 with
pα
pβ + β − pα
· θ < τ < ∞
will invest SY , if the parameter of general investment is larger than a
particular threshold value, or
(p +1 ) β
p + β
< α.
The proof is in the later section. In the case of risk neutrality, speciﬁc
investments are made only to strengthen the agent’s innate comparative
advantage. When the parameter of general investment is smaller than a
particular threshold value, no general investment occurs. If the parameter
is larger, then the general investment occurs for agents with an intermediate
level of comparative advantage. Risk neutral agents will never make speciﬁc
investments in the opposite direction, namely, the direction of the agent’s
innate comparative disadvantage.
Let us state the main result for the RA1 case with log utility.
16Theorem 2 When the assumptions given by A1.-A5. hold in the model
with the RA1 Bernoulli utility function v(M)=l n M, the following two
situations will occur depending on the size of the parameter value of α.
(i) All agents in the economy will make speciﬁc investments, but the di-
rection of investments vary depending on the strength of their innate




0 < τ <
β2
pαθ ⇐⇒ invest SX
β2
pαθ < τ <
pα
β2θ ⇐⇒ indiﬀerent between SX and SY
pα
β2θ < τ < ∞⇐ ⇒ invest SY





(ii) There will be some agents who will make general investments G.I n
particular, agents (θ,τ) ∈ Θ0 with
β
p




will invest G (General investment in both sectors), agents (θ,τ) ∈ Θ0
with




will invest SX, and agents (θ,τ) ∈ Θ0 with
p
β
θ < τ < ∞
will invest SY , if the parameter of general investment is larger than a
particular threshold value, or
p
β < α.
As with the risk neutral case, when the parameter of general investment
is larger than a particular threshold value, then the general investment oc-
curs for agents with an intermediate level of comparative advantage. When
the parameter of general investment is smaller, however, the direction of
speciﬁc investments is quite diﬀerent. Those with a very strong innate com-
parative advantage make speciﬁc investments in their innately strong skills.
17Those with an intermediate comparative advantage are indiﬀerent when it
comes to conducting speciﬁc investments in sector X and sector Y. This is a
striking result. For those who are closer to the 45-degree line, the expected
utility values from SX and SY are the same. This is because of the ﬂexibility
of agents who are in the range of
β2
pα
θ < τ <
pα
β2 θ (13)
about which sector they work in after the realization of the terms of trade.
For those in partition (13), they work in sector X (respectively, Y) if the
terms of trade are favorable for workers in X (respectively, Y).
Let us state the main result for the RA2 case as Thorem 3.
Theorem 3 When the assumptions given by A1.-A5. hold in the model with
the RA2 Bernoulli utility function v(M)=− 1
M, the following two situations
will occur depending on the size of the parameter value of α.
(i) All agents in the economy will make speciﬁc investments, but the di-
rection of investments vary depending on the strength of their innate




0 < τ < 1
1+p−βθ ⇐⇒ invest SX
1
1+p−βθ < τ < θ ⇐⇒ invest SY
θ < τ < (1 + p − β)θ ⇐⇒ invest SX
(1 + p − β)θ < τ < ∞⇐ ⇒invest SY






(ii) There will be some agents who will make general investments G.I n
particular, agents (θ,τ) ∈ Θ0 with
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0 < τ < 1
1+p−βθ ⇐⇒ invest SX
1
1+p−βθ < τ <
β−α
β(α−1)θ ⇐⇒ invest SY
β−α
β(α−1)θ < τ <
β(α−1)
β−α θ ⇐⇒ invest G
β(α−1)
β−α θ < τ < (1 + p − β)θ ⇐⇒ invest SX
(1 + p − β)θ < τ < ∞⇐ ⇒ invest SY





When the degree of risk aversion is very strong for the agents, we ob-
serve a very interesting phenomenon. Some agents specialize in their in-
nately weak skills. When agents are born with very strong comparative
advantages, then they try to develop their strong skills regardless of the un-
certainty about future terms of trade. As the relative ability of the agents
in two sectors get closer, their individual incentive to invest in their human
capital skills becomes something like personal insurance against a possible
misfortune aﬀecting their innately strong skills.
The proofs to the Theorems 1-3 are given below.
2.5 Analysis for Each Partition
Let us start analyzing the incentives to invest in human capital skills for
agents in each partition. Depending on the realized outcome of uncertain
terms of trade, the choice of occupation diﬀers among diﬀerent partitions.
Therefore, the realized income may diﬀer. Based on the expected choice of
occupation and expected income level, the individuals choose to decide to
invest in speciﬁc or general human capital investment.
2.5.1 Partition K1 and K8:
Consider agents in partition K1. All agents in this partition will work in
sector X in period 1 regardless of the realized terms of trade. Their expected














In this case, it is straight forward to show
V (K1,S X) >V(K1,G) >V(K1,S Y ) (15)
regardless of the shapes of Bernoulli utility function. Irrespective of the
attitude toward risks, i.e. RN, RA1, or RA2, the Bernoulli utility functions
are increasing monotonic functions, i.e. v0 > 0. We know that pβθ >p αθ >
pθ and βθ > αθ > θ for p>β > α > 1 because of the assumptions of
19the model. (15) shows that all agents in partition K1 will make a speciﬁc
investment in sector X. The same logic hold true for the agents in partition
K8 and they invest SY .
2.5.2 Partition K2 and K7:
Next, consider agents in partition K2. T h e yw o r ki ns e c t o rXu n l e s st h e y
have invested in SY and the terms of trade turn out to be unfavorable to














From the analysis for K1,w ek n o wt h a t
V (K2,S X) >V(K2,G) (17)
holds always true since V (K2,S X)=V (K1,S X) and V (K2,G)=V (K1,G)
c a nb es e e ni n( 1 6 ) .S ow ea r el e f tt oc o m p a r et h es i z eb e t w e e nV (K2,S X)
and V (K2,S Y ).W es h o u l dn o t et h a tp a r t i t i o nK2 belongs to the region
1
pβ




We ﬁr s tl o o ka tt h eR Nc a s e :v(M)=M. By looking at
2{V (K2,S X) − V (K2,S Y )} =( pβ + β − p)θ − pβτ (19)
we can conclude that the expression (19) is positive because















Second, look at the case for RA1: v(M)=l nM.T h ee x p r e s s i o n
2{V (K2,S X) − V (K2,S Y )} =l nθ − lnτ +l nβ − lnp (20)
is positive because τ <
β
pθ always hold for agents in (18).
Third, look at the RA2 case: v(M)=− 1
M.L e t ’s look at the following
expression:
2{V (K2,S X) − V (K2,S Y )} =
θ − (p +1− β)τ
pβθτ
(21)







and, by noting the inequality (18), we can say that expression (21) is always
positive for agents in K2.
So we can conclude that
V (K2,S X) >V(K2,S Y ) (23)
for all three cases. Therefore, we can conclude that in partition K2,t h e
speciﬁc investment for sector X, SX, is always chosen for all RN, RA1 and
RA2 cases. The same logic hold true for agents in partition K7 and they
invest SY .
2.5.3 Partition K3 and K6:
Now consider agents in partition K3 who are in the region:
1
p




They work in sector Y when the terms of trade are (1,p) only if they had
invested either G or SY .O t h e r w i s e ,t h e yw o r ki ns e c t o rX .T h e r e f o r e ,t h e i r














Note that V (K3,S X)=V (K2,S X) and V (K3,S Y )=V (K2,S Y ),b u tV (K3,G) 6=
V (K2,G).
To conserve space, let Â denote preference over the human capital in-
vestment IHC ∈ {SX,G,S Y } for a particular partition. If it is clear from the
context, assume that the following notation can be used for any i ∈ {1,...,8}:
IHC Â IHC0 for agents in Ki ⇐⇒ V (Ki,IHC) >V(Ki,IHC0).
By using the notation Â, we look at the three cases for agents in K3 and
K6.
21RN case for K3 and K6: Let us ﬁr s tl o o ka tt h eR Nc a s e :v(M)=M.
By looking at
2{V (K3,S X) − V (K3,S Y )} =( pβ + β − p)θ − pβτ (26)
we know this is the same as (19). By looking at the following expression:






(p − β)(β − 1)
pβ
,




pβ + β − p
pβ
(27)
holds true since β > 1 and p>β. Then we can say that SX Â SY for RN
agents in K3. Now we need to compare SX with G.L o o ka t
2{V (K3,S X) − V (K3,G)} =( pβ − pα + β)θ − pατ. (28)
The sign of (28) depends on the direction of the following inequality:
τ ≷
pβ + β − pα
pα
θ
Considering the condition for partition (24),
τ <
















⇔ SX Â G. (29)







SX Â G for 1
pθ < τ <
pβ−pα+β
pα θ
G Â SX for
pβ−pα+β




The same logic can explain symmetrically the agents in K6.
22RA1 case for K3 and K6: Look at the case for RA1: v(M)=l nM.W e
can conclude that SX Â SY for RA1 agents in K3 because
2{V (K3,S X) − V (K3,S Y )} =l nβ +l nθ − lnp − lnτ (31)
is positive for τ <
β
pθ.I f w e n o w c o m p a r e SX and G, there are two cases
depending on the parameter values for α and β.L o o ka t
2{V (K3,S X) − V (K3,G)} =2l nβ +l nθ − 2lnα − lnp − lnτ (32)




hence, the direction of inequality in β ≶ α2.W ec a ne a s i l ys e et h a t
β > α2 =⇒ SX Â G (33)






Otherwise, the region in K3 is divided into two in the following manner:
β < α2 ⇔
(
SX Â G for 1
pθ < τ <
β2
pα2θ
G Â SX for
β2




Some workers in K3 choose to make a speciﬁc investment in X while others
make general investments. The same logic can explain symmetrically the
agents in K6.
RA2 case for K3 and K6: Now let us look at the case for RA2: v(M)=
− 1
M. To provide the integrated analysis, we postpone the analysis for the
RA2 case for agents in K3 and K6 to the section under the title: RA2 case:
K4 and K5.
2.5.4 Partition K4 and K5:
Now consider agents in partition K4 who are in the region:
β
p
θ < τ < θ. (35)
23T h e s ea r et h em o s tﬂexible workers. So all of them work in sector X (respec-
tively, Y) when the terms of trade is (p,1) (respectively, (1,p)), irrespective














Note that V (K4,G)=V (K3,G) and V (K4,S Y )=V (K3,S Y ),b u tV (K4,S X) 6=
V (K3,S X).
RN case for K4 and K5: Let us ﬁr s tl o o ka tt h eR Nc a s e :v(M)=M.
By looking at
2{V (K4,S X) − V (K4,S Y )} = p(β − 1)(θ − τ)
which is positive because of (35) and p>0 and β > 1,w ec a nc o n c l u d et h a t
SX Â SY
for agents in K4.N o ww eh a v et oc o m p a r eSX with G.L o o ka t
2{V (K4,S X) − V (K4,G)} = p[(β − α)θ − (α − 1)τ] (37)





There are three possible parameter spaces:




























0 < τ <
β−α
α−1θ ⇐⇒ invest SX
β−α
α−1θ < τ < θ ⇐⇒ invest G
should hold.







(p +1 ) β
p + β
< α (39)





for all agents in K4.
The last case must combine with the analysis on K3. The same logic can
explain symmetrically the agents in K5.
RA1 case for K4 and K5: Let us ﬁr s tl o o ka tt h eR A 1c a s e :v(M)=
lnM. By looking at
2{V (K4,S X) − V (K4,S Y )} =0 ,
we must conclude that SX ∼ SY for all agents in K4.T o c o m p a r e w i t h
g e n e r a li n v e s t m e n t s ,l o o ka t
2{V (K4,S X) − V (K4,G)} =l nβ − 2lnα
whose sign depends on the direction of inequality in
β ≷ α2.
If β > α2 holds, then we should know that SX ∼ SY Â G for all agents in
K4. Therefore, we can say that
SX ∼ SY ⇔
β
p
θ < τ < θ.





holds. Therefore, we know that G Â SX ∼ SY for all agents in K4.T h i s
last case must combine with the analysis of K3. The same logic can explain
symmetrically about the agents in K5.
25RA2 case for K4 and K5: L e tu sl o o ka tt h eR A 2c a s e :v(M)=− 1
M.
Here we want to analyze partitions K3 and K4 together. The case for
partitions K5 and K6 is similar, so we omit the analysis.
We ﬁrst make it clear that agents belong to the regions:
(
K3 : 1





pθ < τ < θ .
We also list here the conditions for the preference of agents for investment
types. Because V (K4,G)=V (K3,G) and V (K4,S Y )=V (K3,S Y ) holds,
the relationship between G and SY is the same between K3 and K4.B y
checking the sign of the expression
2{V (Ki,S Y ) − V (Ki,G)} =
(β − α)θ − β(α − 1)τ
pαβθτ
for i =3 ,4,




β(α−1)θ ⇔ G Â SY for K3 and K4
τ <
β−α
β(α−1)θ ⇔ SY Â G for K3 and K4
(40)
Now start looking at partition K3, to compare the two speciﬁci n v e s t -
ments, we must look at the sign of the following expression:
2{V (K3,S X) − V (K3,S Y )} =
θ − (1 + p − β)τ
pβθτ
(41)
and we can conclude that
(
τ > 1
1+p−βθ ⇔ SY Â SX for K3
τ < 1
1+p−βθ ⇔ SX Â SY for K3
. (42)
If we compare SX and G,w em u s tc h e c kt h es i g no ft h ef o l l o w i n g :
2{V (K3,S X) − V (K3,G)} =
βθ− (α + pα − β)τ
pαβθτ
(43)




α+pα−βθ ⇔ G Â SY for K3
τ <
β
α+pα−βθ ⇔ SY Â G for K3
. (44)
Look at partition K4.L e tu sﬁrst compare the two speciﬁci n v e s t m e n t s .
Look at
2{V (K4,S X) − V (K4,S Y )} =
α(β − 1)(τ − θ)
pαβθτ
26w h i c hi sa l w a y sp o s i t i v eb e c a u s eα > 0, β > 1 and τ > θ for all agents in
K4. Therefore, we can conclude that
SY Â SX for all agents in K4 . (45)
If we compare SX and G for partition K4, we must check the sign of the
following:
2{V (K4,S X) − V (K4,G)} =
(β − α)τ − β(α − 1)θ
pαβθτ




β−α θ ⇔ SX Â G for K4
τ <
β(α−1)
β−α θ ⇔ G Â SX for K4
. (46)
To prepare the further analysis, we now claim the following two results:










Proof. The left side of (47) is obvious because β > 1.T op r o v et h er i g h t
side,
1




⇔ β(β − 1) <p (β − 1)
which is true for β <pby assumption.
The second result is given here.


























⇔ (β − 1)(β − p) < 0






⇔ (β − 1)(β − p) < 0
which is also true. This concludes the proof.
Now, given the relative size in (48), we can analyze ﬁve cases depending
on the size of the parameter α:


















































This is because α <
2β
p+1 automatically imply α <
p+β
p+1 and α <
2β
β+1,






















β−α < 1 <
β−α
β(α−1)
Together with (47), (49) and (50) can be shown. If we summarize all condi-







pθ < τ < 1
1+p−βθ ⇔ SX Â SY Â G
1
1+p−βθ < τ <
β
pθ ⇔ SY Â SX Â G
β
pθ < τ < θ ⇔ SY Â SX Â G
282.5.6 Case 2:
2β





























p+1 automatically imply α <
2β





















β−α < 1 <
β−α
β(α−1)
Together with (47), (51) can be shown. If we summarize all conditions
(40)-(46), we can state the following results for the case
2β







pθ < τ < 1
1+p−βθ ⇔ SX Â SY Â G
1
1+p−βθ < τ <
β
pθ ⇔ SY Â SX Â G
β
pθ < τ < θ ⇔ SY Â SX Â G
2.5.7 Case 3:
p+β





p+1 < α <
2β



















We can derive a few results:
(
p+β











β−α < 1 <
β−α
β(α−1)
We also have to check if
β





29cannot occur. Suppose it does. Then we will encounter a contradiction
because there must exist agents within
β
α + pα − β
θ ≤ τ ≤
1
p − (β − 1)
θ (54)





which violates the transitivity of the preference.





since (52) and (53). SX º SY because of the right side in (54) and whose
preference can also be represented by SX º G because of the left side of
(54). This leads to (55).
If we summarize all conditions (40)-(46), we can state the following re-
sults for the case 3:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
1
pθ < τ < 1
1+p−βθ ⇔ SX Â SY Â G
1
1+p−βθ < τ <
β
α+pα−βθ ⇔ SY Â SX Â G
β
α+pα−βθ < τ <
β(α−1)
β−α θ ⇔ SY Â G Â SX
β(α−1)
β−α θ < τ < θ ⇔ SY Â SX Â G
2.5.8 Case 4:
2β





β+1 < α <
β(β+p)





















β+1 < α automatically implies
p+β













β+1 < α ⇔
β−α











30In addition to the above, we must check if
β





cannot occur. Suppose it does. Then we will encounter a contradiction
because there must exist agents within
β
α + pα − β
θ ≤ τ ≤
1
p − (β − 1)
θ (59)





which violates the transitivity of the preference.





since (56). SX º SY because of the right side in (59) and whose preference
can also be represented by SX º G because of the left side of (59). This
leads to (60).
If we summarize all conditions (40)-(46), we can state the following re-
sults for case 4.
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
1
pθ < τ < 1
1+p−βθ ⇔ SX Â SY Â G
1
1+p−βθ < τ <
β
α+pα−βθ ⇔ SY Â SX Â G
β
α+pα−βθ < τ <
β−α
β(α−1)θ ⇔ SY Â G Â SX
β−α



























β2+p < α automatically imply
p+β
p+1 < α and
2β
β+1 < α,w ec a n













β+1 < α ⇔
β−α















α + pα − β
(63)
cannot occur. Suppose it does. Then we will encounter a contradiction
because there must exist the agents within
β − α
β(α − 1)
θ ≤ τ ≤
β
α + pα − β
θ (64)





which violates the transitivity of the preference.





since (61). G º SY because of the left side in (64) and whose preference can
also be represented by SX º G because of the right side of (64). This leads
to (65).
If we summarize all conditions (40)-(46), we can state the following re-
sults for the case 5:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
1
pθ < τ < 1
1+p−βθ ⇔ SX Â SY Â G
1
1+p−βθ < τ <
β
α+pα−βθ ⇔ SY Â SX Â G
β
α+pα−βθ < τ <
β−α
β(α−1)θ ⇔ SY Â G Â SX
β−α
β(α−1)θ < τ < θ ⇔ G Â SY Â SX
322.5.10 Summary of Cases
Case 1-3 can be summarized to be
(
1
pθ < τ < 1
1+p−βθ ⇐⇒ invest SX
1
1+p−βθ < τ < θ ⇐⇒ invest SY
for the agents in K3 and K4 with α <
2β
β+1.





pθ < τ < 1
1+p−βθ ⇐⇒ invest SX
1
1+p−βθ < τ <
β−α
β(α−1)θ ⇐⇒ invest SY
β−α
β(α−1)θ < τ < θ ⇐⇒ invest G
for the agents in K3 and K4 with
2β
β+1 < α.
The same logic can explain symmetrically the agents in K5 and K6.A n d
together with the analysis for K1 and K2 (K7 and K8), this proves the result
in Theorem 3.
3C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, I extended the model of occupational choice to a two-period
case. I now allow human capital skills investments by individual agents and
will examine the incentives by individuals when they start out from diﬀerent
combinations of multi-dimensional innate capabilities. In general, special-
ization enhances the productive capabilities of society through the division
of labor. Investing in speciﬁc skills, however, may be a risky strategy for an
individual agent if there is no insurance market under uncertainty. Human
capital investment in general skills is usually considered to be a form of
self-insurance. Previous work in this ﬁeld dealt with a case where every
individual is identical before his human capital investment. The model
introduced in this paper analyzed the investment decision problem when
individual agents are heterogeneous in the sense of both absolute and com-
parative advantages in diﬀerent sectors. The paper analyzed a case in which
we encounter terms of trade uncertainty.
I identify the conditions determining when agents will invest in general
skills and when they specialize in a particular sector. Depending on parame-
ter values: α,β, and p, it is quite possible for all individuals to invest in their
innately strong skills even if there is no insurance market. For the agents
with a narrower comparative advantage (those who are close to the 45-degree
33line in the unit square), general investment may occur when parameter α
is relatively stronger. For risk neutral agents, I did not ﬁnd anyone who
invested in human capital skills in the direction of their innate comparative
disadvantage.
Our RN (risk neutral) case results are favored toward speciﬁci n v e s t m e n t
in skills where agents have innate comparative advantages, probably for the
following reasons. First, the agents are assumed to be risk neutral rather
than risk averse. Risk neutral agents simply try to maximize expected in-
come rather than expected utility. Therefore, given the set up of the model
in this paper, agents ﬁnd it worthwhile to enhance their strong skills rather
than bolstering their weaker skills. Second, investment technology is as-
sumed to be one of constant returns to scale. The investment coeﬃcients
α and β are multiplied proportionately by θ and τ,t h ea g e n t s ’ skill lev-
els prior to investment. Thus, agents who already had a high θ (before
investment) will derive more beneﬁt from training through either general
or speciﬁc investment than agents with a lower value of θ. Agents with
stronger comparative advantage in one sector will ﬁnd themselves better oﬀ
when they invest in the skills that deliver the best return on investment.
Third, the structure of uncertainty in this paper is limited to a very spe-
ciﬁc case of equal probabilities over two states of nature. The choice of
this uncertainty structure is done in favor of simplicity, but it is true that
individual incentives will change if we change the probability distribution.
Future research can address these extensions.
When we look at cases of risk averse agents, things become very diﬀerent.
The relative relationship between the speciﬁc versus general investments
is similar: general investments are made only when the parameter α is
larger and they occur only for those who are close to the 45-degree line.
However, the analysis for speciﬁc investments for risk averse agents shows
quite diﬀerent results from that of risk neutral agents. We found cases where
agents invest in speciﬁc skills in the opposite direction. Some agents try to
speciﬁcally invest in their weak skills. In the end, for some agents, there is
a reversal of comparative advantage if we compare the ex ante and ex post
of the agent’s human capital investment.
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36A The Relationship between CPI and Welfare for
Homothetic Demand
When the utility function u(x,y) is homothetic and strictly monotone, then
we can write its indirect utility function as separable in the price part
C(PX,P Y ) and the income v(M) part, i.e.,
V (PX,P Y ,I)=C(PX,P Y ) · v(M) (66)
where v(·) is an strictly increasing function.
Claim 1 1
C(PX,PY ) is a measure of consumer price index.
When we want to compare welfare across diﬀerent times, the change in
relative prices is always a nuisance. But if we assume that C(PX,P Y ) is
symmetric in PX and PY , then we can conclude that
C(p,1) = C(1,p) (67)
Thus, when equation (67) holds, then the comparison of income function
v(M) is a one-to-one relationship with the comparison of welfare.
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